Volkswagen diesel scandal
10-11-15, 10:33 AM
#316
What if someone puts in disable code for all of the vehicles on 1.1.2016? What about someone putting code that activates cruise control at 200mph in residental area? God save us from these rogue engineers, who knows what can they do...lol.
Thats just funny... code is reviewed and worked on by hundreds of engineers.
Bosch already said that they have sent code to VW but told them it is only for testing and not for real world usage.
10-11-15, 12:53 PM
#317
lol, thats just hillariously wrong... do you think rogue engineers can leave anything they want in VW ecu's?
What if someone puts in disable code for all of the vehicles on 1.1.2016? What about someone putting code that activates cruise control at 200mph in residental area? God save us from these rogue engineers, who knows what can they do...lol.
Thats just funny... code is reviewed and worked on by hundreds of engineers.
Bosch already said that they have sent code to VW but told them it is only for testing and not for real world usage.
What if someone puts in disable code for all of the vehicles on 1.1.2016? What about someone putting code that activates cruise control at 200mph in residental area? God save us from these rogue engineers, who knows what can they do...lol.
Thats just funny... code is reviewed and worked on by hundreds of engineers.
Bosch already said that they have sent code to VW but told them it is only for testing and not for real world usage.
This is the reality. It is possible, not just a what if, esp with management that only asks for results in a fixed timeframe or your head rolls.
Engineers, Financial professionals are very very creative people.
10-11-15, 05:00 PM
#318
So to save your job you would committed fraud and single handily put the company at risk. How noble of you. These engineers weren't working on shopping carts or something similar,they were working on a product that had to meet emission standards all over the world. Im sure there were dozens if not hundreds working on this issue, that means a whole bunch of these engineers would have conspired to make this happen and not let higher ups knowing what they are doing, again not a chance.
10-11-15, 05:39 PM
#319
Lexus Fanatic
Before everyone gangs up on chikoo, even if you disagree with him, check this out. According to this business article, what he is suggesting may not be that far-fetched or impossible at all.
http://www.nbcnews.com/business/auto...eating-n441451
Michael Horn, CEO of Volkswagen America, met with an incredulous response from several U.S. lawmakers Thursday when he testified that the German automaker's emissions cheating scandal was the work of a handful of rogue employees, not a high-level corporate conspiracy.
But some auto industry insiders say it's not inconceivable that senior management could have been ignorant of the details of the cheating, even as they instilled the corporate culture that led to the subterfuge.
ANALYSIS
Horn, testifying before the House subcommittee investigating Volkswagen's rigged software that enabled its four-cylinder diesel engines to cheat on emissions testing, said the so-called "defeat device" was the work of "a couple of software engineers who put this in for whatever reason."
"This was not a corporate decision," he later added. "There was no board meeting that approved this."
Image: Volkswagen America CEO Michael Hotrn Testifies At House Hearing On Emissions Cheating Scandal
Volkswagen Group of America President and CEO Michael Horn testifies before a House investigative subcommittee on Capitol Hill on Thursday. Chip Somodevilla / Getty Images
Among the committee members expressing skepticism over Horn's account was Rep. Chris Collins, a New York Republican, who told the witness he believes the scandal is the result of "a massive cover-up at the highest levels that continues to this day."
VW Scandal: German Authorities Raid Company Facilities for Evidence
Could a handful of "individuals," in Horn's words, really have taken the steps necessary to install the software into 11 million diesel-powered vehicles, including 482,000 sold over the last seven years in the U.S.?
The significance of the action becomes more apparent when one realizes diesels account for about half of the VW sales in Europe, and a quarter in the U.S. In both cases, the vehicles would have been banned from the roads for failing to meet emissions standards.
Some automotive industry insiders say it's possible, given the corporate culture at VW, that senior management could have set the tone that made such a scheme possible -- even necessary - without knowing the details of how it worked.
David Cole, a veteran of the auto industry and chairman-emeritus of the Center for Automotive Research, in Ann Arbor, Michigan, is among them, saying he strongly doubts the cheating was directly ordered by top Volkswagen officials.
"They just don't do this," said Cole, adding that senior managers would know that if the details of such a scheme were to be leaked, "The cover-up would be worse than the crime."
That said, Cole suggested that top management might not be entirely innocent. "You have to understand the German culture," he added. "They're used to getting what they want."
Under the scenario posited by Cole and other industry insiders, while there may have been no direct order from the top to orchestrate the cheating, it is possible - even likely -- that the team charged with developing the EA 189 engine knew that failure was not an option. And that would have left them only one option when it became clear they could not deliver the seemingly impossible blend of good performance, high mileage and low emissions that had been promised.
Volkswagen Recalling Diesels in January for 'Defeat Device'
The success-or-else philosophy at Volkswagen dates back at least to the time when Ferdinand Piech, who retired earlier this year as Volkswagen AG Chairman, was appointed CEO in 1992.
That year he hosted a small group of reporters, including this correspondent, at VW's Wolfsburg, Germany, headquarters, inviting them to look at a prototype of a new sedan that was intended to leapfrog all competitors. After explaining the long list of new features and technical breakthroughs he wanted, Piech was asked what would happen if the engineering team said they couldn't deliver.
"Then I will tell them they are all fired and I will bring in a new team," Piech, the grandson of Ferdinand Porsche, founder of both Porsche and Volkswagen, declared forcefully. "And if they tell me they can't do it, I will fire them, too."
That management tone has been a clear factor in the way Volkswagen has been run in the intervening decades, even after Piech moved into the chairman's role, replaced by his hand-picked - and equally driven - successor, Martin Winterkorn. Winterkorn resigned on Sept. 23, just five days after the scandal became public, but said he did not have knowledge of any wrongdoing.
Exactly who was aware that the engineers and software programmers directly involved in the diesel project were cheating? That's likely to take some time to answer. But to CAR's Cole and many observers, top VW managers set the tone, whether they are legally culpable or not.
But Collins, the New York congressman and himself a former engineer, told TheDetroitBureau.com in an interview late Thursday that he finds it "inconceivable" that such a complex plan could have executed by a few lone wolves, especially considering the extreme importance of the diesel engine to VW.
Recalling his own work helping develop a high-efficiency electric motor for Westinghouse Electric in 1977, Collins said he believes top managers would have been closely watching the project, and would have demanded to know how the development team was able to meet the emissions threshold after multiple early failures.
Another expert who doubts Horn's explanation is Arvind Thiruvengadam, a researcher at West Virginia University who was part of the team that found Volkswagen's diesels were in violation of U.S. emissions standards. Asked if Horn's explanation made sense to him, the assistant professor said simply, "I doubt it."
Like Collins, Thiruvengadam said the addition of the cheating code to the vehicles' emissions controls would have been too complex for a few individuals to pull off.
Collins also faulted VW's internal investigation, saying it should have taken the automaker "four hours" to get to the bottom of the scandal and find out who knew what and when, not the months they say the investigation will take.
Either somebody was "asleep at the switch or incompetent, or it was a massive cover-up, which I think it is," he said.
In a bid to find out who had knowledge of the scheme, and when, German prosecutors on Thursday raided various VW offices, including the automaker's headquarters in Wolfsburg.
And in the U.S., the congressional committee has joined a growing list of government agencies trying to find out how high up the Volkswagen command chain knowledge of the cheating extended, including the U.S. Justice Department, the EPA and California air quality officials.
But officials on both sides of the Atlantic have cautioned it will take time to pull together the facts of the case - as VW itself gets its own internal investigation underway.
http://www.nbcnews.com/business/auto...eating-n441451
Michael Horn, CEO of Volkswagen America, met with an incredulous response from several U.S. lawmakers Thursday when he testified that the German automaker's emissions cheating scandal was the work of a handful of rogue employees, not a high-level corporate conspiracy.
But some auto industry insiders say it's not inconceivable that senior management could have been ignorant of the details of the cheating, even as they instilled the corporate culture that led to the subterfuge.
ANALYSIS
Horn, testifying before the House subcommittee investigating Volkswagen's rigged software that enabled its four-cylinder diesel engines to cheat on emissions testing, said the so-called "defeat device" was the work of "a couple of software engineers who put this in for whatever reason."
"This was not a corporate decision," he later added. "There was no board meeting that approved this."
Image: Volkswagen America CEO Michael Hotrn Testifies At House Hearing On Emissions Cheating Scandal
Volkswagen Group of America President and CEO Michael Horn testifies before a House investigative subcommittee on Capitol Hill on Thursday. Chip Somodevilla / Getty Images
Among the committee members expressing skepticism over Horn's account was Rep. Chris Collins, a New York Republican, who told the witness he believes the scandal is the result of "a massive cover-up at the highest levels that continues to this day."
VW Scandal: German Authorities Raid Company Facilities for Evidence
Could a handful of "individuals," in Horn's words, really have taken the steps necessary to install the software into 11 million diesel-powered vehicles, including 482,000 sold over the last seven years in the U.S.?
The significance of the action becomes more apparent when one realizes diesels account for about half of the VW sales in Europe, and a quarter in the U.S. In both cases, the vehicles would have been banned from the roads for failing to meet emissions standards.
Some automotive industry insiders say it's possible, given the corporate culture at VW, that senior management could have set the tone that made such a scheme possible -- even necessary - without knowing the details of how it worked.
David Cole, a veteran of the auto industry and chairman-emeritus of the Center for Automotive Research, in Ann Arbor, Michigan, is among them, saying he strongly doubts the cheating was directly ordered by top Volkswagen officials.
"They just don't do this," said Cole, adding that senior managers would know that if the details of such a scheme were to be leaked, "The cover-up would be worse than the crime."
That said, Cole suggested that top management might not be entirely innocent. "You have to understand the German culture," he added. "They're used to getting what they want."
Under the scenario posited by Cole and other industry insiders, while there may have been no direct order from the top to orchestrate the cheating, it is possible - even likely -- that the team charged with developing the EA 189 engine knew that failure was not an option. And that would have left them only one option when it became clear they could not deliver the seemingly impossible blend of good performance, high mileage and low emissions that had been promised.
Volkswagen Recalling Diesels in January for 'Defeat Device'
The success-or-else philosophy at Volkswagen dates back at least to the time when Ferdinand Piech, who retired earlier this year as Volkswagen AG Chairman, was appointed CEO in 1992.
That year he hosted a small group of reporters, including this correspondent, at VW's Wolfsburg, Germany, headquarters, inviting them to look at a prototype of a new sedan that was intended to leapfrog all competitors. After explaining the long list of new features and technical breakthroughs he wanted, Piech was asked what would happen if the engineering team said they couldn't deliver.
"Then I will tell them they are all fired and I will bring in a new team," Piech, the grandson of Ferdinand Porsche, founder of both Porsche and Volkswagen, declared forcefully. "And if they tell me they can't do it, I will fire them, too."
That management tone has been a clear factor in the way Volkswagen has been run in the intervening decades, even after Piech moved into the chairman's role, replaced by his hand-picked - and equally driven - successor, Martin Winterkorn. Winterkorn resigned on Sept. 23, just five days after the scandal became public, but said he did not have knowledge of any wrongdoing.
Exactly who was aware that the engineers and software programmers directly involved in the diesel project were cheating? That's likely to take some time to answer. But to CAR's Cole and many observers, top VW managers set the tone, whether they are legally culpable or not.
But Collins, the New York congressman and himself a former engineer, told TheDetroitBureau.com in an interview late Thursday that he finds it "inconceivable" that such a complex plan could have executed by a few lone wolves, especially considering the extreme importance of the diesel engine to VW.
Recalling his own work helping develop a high-efficiency electric motor for Westinghouse Electric in 1977, Collins said he believes top managers would have been closely watching the project, and would have demanded to know how the development team was able to meet the emissions threshold after multiple early failures.
Another expert who doubts Horn's explanation is Arvind Thiruvengadam, a researcher at West Virginia University who was part of the team that found Volkswagen's diesels were in violation of U.S. emissions standards. Asked if Horn's explanation made sense to him, the assistant professor said simply, "I doubt it."
Like Collins, Thiruvengadam said the addition of the cheating code to the vehicles' emissions controls would have been too complex for a few individuals to pull off.
Collins also faulted VW's internal investigation, saying it should have taken the automaker "four hours" to get to the bottom of the scandal and find out who knew what and when, not the months they say the investigation will take.
Either somebody was "asleep at the switch or incompetent, or it was a massive cover-up, which I think it is," he said.
In a bid to find out who had knowledge of the scheme, and when, German prosecutors on Thursday raided various VW offices, including the automaker's headquarters in Wolfsburg.
And in the U.S., the congressional committee has joined a growing list of government agencies trying to find out how high up the Volkswagen command chain knowledge of the cheating extended, including the U.S. Justice Department, the EPA and California air quality officials.
But officials on both sides of the Atlantic have cautioned it will take time to pull together the facts of the case - as VW itself gets its own internal investigation underway.
Last edited by mmarshall; 10-11-15 at 05:48 PM.
10-11-15, 06:12 PM
#320
If you believe that single person can do whatever they want in large organization like this, then you also believe that same person can also input unsafe malicious code that can make their cars unsafe to drive.
So if thats the case, we should all avoid VW group cars in the future, since their management obviously has not clue about whats going on in their vehicles, and how can we trust them with our family lives?
so either they willingly defrauded governments around the world and 11 million of their buyers, or they are grossly incompetent organization that has no control over what goes in their vehicles.
If they are trully incompetent and any engineer can easily input anything they want into cars critical system, then we should recall all of their vehicles, and forbid their usage until we can ensure their safety.
10-11-15, 06:21 PM
#321
Collins also faulted VW's internal investigation, saying it should have taken the automaker "four hours" to get to the bottom of the scandal and find out who knew what and when, not the months they say the investigation will take.
Either somebody was "asleep at the switch or incompetent, or it was a massive cover-up, which I think it is," he said.
In a bid to find out who had knowledge of the scheme, and when, German prosecutors on Thursday raided various VW offices, including the automaker's headquarters in Wolfsburg.
And in the U.S., the congressional committee has joined a growing list of government agencies trying to find out how high up the Volkswagen command chain knowledge of the cheating extended, including the U.S. Justice Department, the EPA and California air quality officials.
Either somebody was "asleep at the switch or incompetent, or it was a massive cover-up, which I think it is," he said.
In a bid to find out who had knowledge of the scheme, and when, German prosecutors on Thursday raided various VW offices, including the automaker's headquarters in Wolfsburg.
And in the U.S., the congressional committee has joined a growing list of government agencies trying to find out how high up the Volkswagen command chain knowledge of the cheating extended, including the U.S. Justice Department, the EPA and California air quality officials.
If this was announced 10 months ago, VW would likely have to pull millions of cars out of their dealer lots without replacement being ready. In the meantime, they did fake recall in December 2014 to give them time for introduction of new engines that are EuroVI compliant and that were coming anyway - Euro VI is mandatory since 1st of September 2015, so no wonder they announced this few days later. By then, 95% of their cars on their dealer lots were already new engines.
10-11-15, 09:31 PM
#322
Lexus Fanatic
mmarshal - it is obvious that VW stalled for 1.5 years in order to get this engine out of their current vehicles so it wont affect their sales when finally this is published. VW only admitted this fraud after EPA didnt give them license for all of the 2016 TDI engines - which are all new, with SCR (urea) that "solves" this issue.
10-11-15, 09:39 PM
#323
Auto companies have safeguards against single point of failure like this.
If you believe that single person can do whatever they want in large organization like this, then you also believe that same person can also input unsafe malicious code that can make their cars unsafe to drive.
So if thats the case, we should all avoid VW group cars in the future, since their management obviously has not clue about whats going on in their vehicles, and how can we trust them with our family lives?
so either they willingly defrauded governments around the world and 11 million of their buyers, or they are grossly incompetent organization that has no control over what goes in their vehicles.
If they are trully incompetent and any engineer can easily input anything they want into cars critical system, then we should recall all of their vehicles, and forbid their usage until we can ensure their safety.
If you believe that single person can do whatever they want in large organization like this, then you also believe that same person can also input unsafe malicious code that can make their cars unsafe to drive.
So if thats the case, we should all avoid VW group cars in the future, since their management obviously has not clue about whats going on in their vehicles, and how can we trust them with our family lives?
so either they willingly defrauded governments around the world and 11 million of their buyers, or they are grossly incompetent organization that has no control over what goes in their vehicles.
If they are trully incompetent and any engineer can easily input anything they want into cars critical system, then we should recall all of their vehicles, and forbid their usage until we can ensure their safety.
10-11-15, 09:43 PM
#324
So to save your job you would committed fraud and single handily put the company at risk. How noble of you. These engineers weren't working on shopping carts or something similar,they were working on a product that had to meet emission standards all over the world. Im sure there were dozens if not hundreds working on this issue, that means a whole bunch of these engineers would have conspired to make this happen and not let higher ups knowing what they are doing, again not a chance.
10-12-15, 05:41 AM
#325
They're used to getting what they want."
In this situation, nobody questions the motives nor the actions of crack team of engineers. What happens when this crack team realizes what the mgt wants is not possible given the technology and the timeline?
10-12-15, 06:51 AM
#326
Mr. Horn was coached by some very good lawyers. He was trained to overstate the issue, circumventing the dangerous areas which only tells me it must be really bad. Of course the board didn't meet to authorize the fraud. I doubt that it was ever discussed at a meeting, officially. That does NOT answer the question, "Who knew what and when did they know it?"
Just because it doesn't appear in board meeting minutes doesn't mean a member of the board didn't know what was going on.
The letter from Bosch is interesting, but to me the critical point that I would focus on was the 2011 internal investigation that occurred when a technician reported the fraudulent software. I was an investigator working in another heavily regulated industry. There is no way that report was only issued inside the Engineering department and only to those who had participated in the creation of the software. Someone very high at VW got ahold of that report and quashed it. That's where I would begin my investigation. Next I would move to who handled the 2014 US EPA contact asserting there was a problem with the VW diesel. There had to have been a meeting where the responses were discussed. It's clear that at some point, engineering reported the fraud. When did that happen and did the board immediately disclose this information or did they support the evasive responses that continued for a year. That information is an indication of how long the board knew before 2014.
The investigation won't find a smoking gun, but there are many other clues in internal memos and e-mails that will disclose who knew what and when did they know it.
IMHO, VW already knows all the answers to all of these questions, but they are continuing to try to figure out how to minimize the impact not understanding that this type of action only makes it worse in the long run.
Just because it doesn't appear in board meeting minutes doesn't mean a member of the board didn't know what was going on.
The letter from Bosch is interesting, but to me the critical point that I would focus on was the 2011 internal investigation that occurred when a technician reported the fraudulent software. I was an investigator working in another heavily regulated industry. There is no way that report was only issued inside the Engineering department and only to those who had participated in the creation of the software. Someone very high at VW got ahold of that report and quashed it. That's where I would begin my investigation. Next I would move to who handled the 2014 US EPA contact asserting there was a problem with the VW diesel. There had to have been a meeting where the responses were discussed. It's clear that at some point, engineering reported the fraud. When did that happen and did the board immediately disclose this information or did they support the evasive responses that continued for a year. That information is an indication of how long the board knew before 2014.
The investigation won't find a smoking gun, but there are many other clues in internal memos and e-mails that will disclose who knew what and when did they know it.
IMHO, VW already knows all the answers to all of these questions, but they are continuing to try to figure out how to minimize the impact not understanding that this type of action only makes it worse in the long run.
10-12-15, 07:40 AM
#327
Lexus Champion
This scenario happens for us all of the time. The corporation I work for makes it very easy for any engineer to raise that flag to state that whatever is being requested cannot be achieved. I've done it many times before. I never fear for losing my job when telling senior management and/or executives that I cannot do what is being requested. There is a defined process when this situation arises. I would only fear for my job if I did not tell management my concern, and tried to make it work by circumventing the process.
I would hope VW would have the kind of atmosphere where engineers are respected and heard, and can feel free to come forward with issues and notify management when technical performance measures cannot be met.
10-12-15, 08:03 AM
#328
I am an engineer, though not in automotive, but I thought I'd weigh in.
This scenario happens for us all of the time. The corporation I work for makes it very easy for any engineer to raise that flag to state that whatever is being requested cannot be achieved. I've done it many times before. I never fear for losing my job when telling senior management and/or executives that I cannot do what is being requested. There is a defined process when this situation arises. I would only fear for my job if I did not tell management my concern, and tried to make it work by circumventing the process.
I would hope VW would have the kind of atmosphere where engineers are respected and heard, and can feel free to come forward with issues and notify management when technical performance measures cannot be met.
This scenario happens for us all of the time. The corporation I work for makes it very easy for any engineer to raise that flag to state that whatever is being requested cannot be achieved. I've done it many times before. I never fear for losing my job when telling senior management and/or executives that I cannot do what is being requested. There is a defined process when this situation arises. I would only fear for my job if I did not tell management my concern, and tried to make it work by circumventing the process.
I would hope VW would have the kind of atmosphere where engineers are respected and heard, and can feel free to come forward with issues and notify management when technical performance measures cannot be met.
I am glad I don't work for a taskmaster corporation such as VW. In my role, I am responsible for the enterprise platform. I am the senior mgt, and I can see how easy it is to do this at the level of the product engineers if I pushed them into a corner. Audits are generally after the fact, and not immediate. Such frauds will be discovered, sooner or later. All they did was buy time to find another job before they are fired.
Additionally, if the mandate to the lead engineer is "do what it takes to pass the EPA tests, and I give you full authority to do all that is needed", this gives the senior management plausible deniability.
Last edited by chikoo; 10-12-15 at 08:09 AM.
10-12-15, 08:12 AM
#329
I just read this, and this is what I am talking about.
After explaining the long list of new features and technical breakthroughs he wanted, Piech was asked what would happen if the engineering team said they couldn't deliver.
"Then I will tell them they are all fired and I will bring in a new team," Piech, the grandson of Ferdinand Porsche, founder of both Porsche and Volkswagen, declared forcefully. "And if they tell me they can't do it, I will fire them, too."
"Then I will tell them they are all fired and I will bring in a new team," Piech, the grandson of Ferdinand Porsche, founder of both Porsche and Volkswagen, declared forcefully. "And if they tell me they can't do it, I will fire them, too."
10-12-15, 08:14 AM
#330
Lexus Champion
Indeed, I am very thankful that we have an open culture where I work. There are so many reviews and signatures here that I don't actually think I could "sneak" something in without a lot of other people on board, all the way up to higher levels of management and regulatory officials. I would never risk it. We have an "ethics hotline" where we can anonymously report concerns like this if needed, and have an independent group investigate. I have no idea how VW works though.
My workplace has around 20,000 engineers. Much less than VW I suspect, but not small by any means.
My workplace has around 20,000 engineers. Much less than VW I suspect, but not small by any means.